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1 Introduction
In a cross-section of countries of the world, observed levels of general social trust1
are robustly positively correlated with GDP per capita. Within most countries or
regions, though, people's attitudes such as trust and trustworthiness are puzzlingly
persistent across time, reacting to changes in the level of economic development very
slowly. Distrust, on the other hand, generally slows growth down, and may even
preclude it in some cases. Similar patterns are observed with social capital: in richer
countries, people are generally quite willing to form and maintain social ties with
people dissimilar to themselves, whereas in poorer areas, people usually restrict their
social ties to family members. Again, fast economic growth or relative auence do
not automatically shift people's attention from kin towards non-kin. On the contrary,
family-based closed networks turn out to be very persistent and provide a drag both
on social trust and on the pace of economic development.2
This apparent discrepancy between cross-section and time-series evidence on the
relationships between GDP per capita, patterns of social ties, and general social trust,
makes social capital and trust formation a natural candidate for a mechanism which
could give rise to persistent inequality in levels of economic development. To our
knowledge, such a mechanism has hitherto never been formalized in the literature.
This paper is intended to ll this gap.
The contribution of this paper is thus to propose a novel mechanism able to
generate poverty traps and multiple equilibria in economic performance. In our model,
high trust and abundant bridging social capital (i.e., plentiful social ties with people
in a dierent socio-economic position, cf. Putnam 2000; Leonard, 2008) reinforce each
other leading to a\high"equilibrium where both these variables take persistently high
values, and earnings and well-being are high as well, whereas low trust and lacking
bridging social capital create a vicious circle leading to a \low trust trap" where all
these variables are persistently low.
More specically, the primary hypothesis of the current study (reected in the
logic of the theoretical model but also in the implications of contemporary literature
in sociology and social psychology) is that low levels of bridging social capital go
together with low social trust, acting as an impediment for economic catch-up with
1That is, trust towards people whom one does not know, measured, e.g., as a percentage of
positive answers to the survey question: \Could most people be trusted?"
2This point has been made perhaps most forcefully for the case of Southern Italy by Putnam,
Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993).
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wealthier regions and countries. Family-oriented and distrustful societies may become
permanently trapped in a low bridging social capital{low trust equilibrium where the
formation of social ties with dissimilar people is systematically discouraged by the
lack of general trust, and conversely, where low levels of trust are reinforced by the
lack of contact with dissimilar others.3 Being\trapped" in the currently discussed low
equilibrium precludes economic convergence with more developed regions of the world
because it imposes substantial transaction costs, slows down the ow of information,
prevents implementation of innovative ideas, and limits people's cooperativeness and
thrift (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Inglehart and Baker, 2000;
Florida, 2004; Klapwijk and Van Lange, 2009; Algan and Cahuc, 2010). If, on the
other hand, bridging social capital is abundant in the society, and individuals are
willing to trust strangers (and if there are no other, e.g. structural or institutional,
barriers), then we should observe generally high levels of economic development, and
fast catch-up of initially backward areas (cf. Beugelsdijk and Smulders, 2003).
Our research relates to at least ve complementary strands of literature, all of
which will be discussed in more detail in the following section. First and foremost,
we dwell on the sociological literature which provides the denition of social capital,
and discusses its dimensionality (e.g. the distinction between bridging and bonding
social capital), measurement, and implications. Secondly, we relate our results to the
literature on the relation between social capital and trust. Thirdly, we justify the
assumptions of our model with sociological and psychological literature discussing
the observed patterns of social capital formation and its interrelation with individ-
ual attitudes and incentives. Fourthly, we relate our work to the literature on the
relationship of bridging social capital and trust with individuals' earnings and (after
aggregation) the regional level of economic development. Finally, the workings of our
model are presented against the background of selected other dynamic models giving
rise to poverty traps and multiple equilibria in economic performance.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents back-
ground evidence supporting our modeling approach. Section 3 lays out the model
and presents its properties, implications, and extensions. Section 4 concludes. Proofs
of propositions have been delegated to the appendix. Some evidence for empirical va-
lidity of the model predictions in the case of Central and Eastern European countries
has been presented in our companion paper, Growiec and Growiec (2011).
3See K. Growiec (2009, 2011), for a sociological rationale as well as empirical evidence for the
case of Poland.
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2 Background evidence from sociology and social
psychology
2.1 Bridging and bonding social capital
The rst strand of literature related to the current article includes sociological stud-
ies providing the denition of social capital and methods of its measurement. In
this respect, we are particularly interested in the network operationalization of social
capital (cf. Lin, 2001) and the distinction between bridging social capital (social ties
with dissimilar others) and bonding social capital (social ties with similar others), put
forward by Putnam (2000). Such an approach is useful for our analytical purposes
because it enables us to delineate people's objective behavior (maintaining social con-
tacts with others) from social norms (trust, reciprocity), and it links social networks
people maintain to resources accessed through them (Bourdieu, 1986; Lin, 2001).
Putnam's (2000) distinction between bridging and bonding social capital is fre-
quently invoked in social capital studies. These two variables are then measured at
the individual level with survey questions aimed at capturing the strength and num-
ber of appropriate types of social ties. Furthermore, aggregates of such survey-based
micro-level measures across communities and societies have become one of the stan-
dard ways to proxy stocks of \societal" social capital across populations. The social
network perspective on social capital is therefore widely shared in sociology (Lin,
2001; Kadushin, 2002; Li, Pickles, and Savage, 2005; Burt, 2005).
2.2 The relationship between social capital and trust
The second strand of sociological and psychological literature related to the current
study deals with general trust. Arguably, modern societies are more then ever based
on general trust and social interactions (Simmel, 1971; Giddens, 1991; Sztompka,
1999; Yamagishi, 2002; Glanville and Paxton, 2007; Klapwijk and Van Lange, 2009),
whereas without trust societies would eectively disintegrate because trust is a syn-
thetic force within the society (Simmel, 1950; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993).
At the same time, general trust turns out to be closely related to bridging social
capital while distrust { to bonding social capital, or strong family ties (Alesina and
Giuliano, 2010). At the individual level, people whose prevailing form of social capital
is the bonding one, or whose social networks are very sparse altogether, are signif-
icantly more likely to present general distrust than those with abundant bridging
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social capital.4 Individual-level data from Poland provide some preliminary evidence
that there might be a universal mutually reinforcing relation between social capital
and general trust (K. Growiec, 2009, 2011).
2.3 Why accumulate social capital?
The third strand of literature which we refer to deals with individuals' motivations
to accumulate social capital. Indeed, while forming their social networks, individu-
als may follow a number of motivations: most importantly, they may seek to satisfy
their safety drive or their eectiveness drive (Bowlby, 1969; Greenberg, 1991). Safety
is associated with aliation and the density of networks, while eectiveness { with
competition and structural holes (Burt, 2005). These dierent functions are served by
the dierent forms of social capital which people build: the \motivation for support
[provided by bonding social capital] is satisfying basic needs or sustaining status quo.
Structural holes [related to bridging social capital] are (...) for creating change and
movement" (Kadushin, 2002, p. 86). Furthermore, dierent psychological predisposi-
tions of individuals can have a marked impact on their social networks. Individuals
for whom their personal identity is more important than their social identity are more
likely to maintain diverse social networks (Kalish and Robins, 2006), i.e. large stocks
of bridging social capital. Surprisingly, people who have many structural holes in
their network are those who are more neurotic, but reveal also a strong conviction of
control over one's own life (Kalish and Robins, 2006) and are more creative (Burt,
1992). Another important mechanism at work here is due to interpersonal comple-
mentarities in social capital formation (Glaeser, Laibson, Sacerdote, 2002): people
whose social contacts have more bridging (respectively, bonding) social capital, tend
to have more bridging (bonding) social capital themselves.
From this literature we infer that social ties with others should be considered a
source of individuals' utility (or subjective well-being) which they maximize, separate
from consumption or leisure. We also infer that the ease of forming bridging social
capital, satisfying the eectiveness but not the safety drive, should be related to the
individuals' levels of social openness and { importantly for the setup of the model
4Apart from social capital, general trust is also related to risk taking and coping with uncertainty
(Dasgupta, 1988; Molm, Takahashi and Peterson, 2000; Cook, Yamagishi, Cheshire, Cooper, Mat-
suda, and Mashima, 2005). Low-trust societies which primarily avoid risk taking, put themselves
at a competitive disadvantage in global markets by doing so, as they can't build complex social
institutions (Fukuyama, 1995).
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below { social trust.
2.4 Social capital, trust, and economic performance
The fourth strand of related literature deals with the impact of social capital and
trust on economic performance at the level of individuals, communities, regions, and
whole countries. Given the aforementioned ndings, one should naturally expect large
dierences between the impacts of bridging and bonding social capital here. And in-
deed, sociological literature argues that bridging social capital, but not bonding social
capital, goes together with civil liberties and the support for gender and racial equal-
ity, and strengthens the functioning of democracy by reducing corruption (Putnam
et al., 1993; Putnam, 2000). On the other hand, \bonding social capital (as distinct
from bridging social capital) has negative eects for society as a whole, but may have
positive eects for the members belonging to this closed social group or network"
(Beugelsdijk and Smulders, 2003). Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2003) proceed to show
that bridging social capital is empirically good for economic growth at the level of
European regions, whereas bonding social capital is bad for growth.
Bridging social capital is also found to be individually benecial for those who
possess it. Granovetter's (1973) most prominent discovery is that weak ties (i.e.,
ties between dissimilar people) facilitate better job nding than strong ties (between
similar people). Friendship ties have also been shown to be positively related to indi-
viduals' wages and upward mobility in the workplace (Podolny and Baron 1997; S lom-
czynski and Tomescu-Dubrow 2005). Most strongly perhaps, Burt (2005) claims that
bridging social capital, as opposed to bonding social capital, is positively related to
individuals' economic performance, creativity, social trust, and happiness. The ques-
tion whether sophisticated social networks indeed improve the individuals' earnings
potential remains unsettled, though: recent research from Franzen and Hangartner
(2006) indicates that using social networks might not necessarily increase the mone-
tary payo but improve the nonpecuniary characteristics of the job like better career
perspectives instead.
Despite Burt's (2005) clear suggestions that bridging social capital should be posi-
tively related to individuals' happiness, the issue of whether social networks inuence
subjective well-being (SWB) has not been fully settled either. Even more worryingly,
earnings and SWB are directly interrelated as well, complicating the matter even
further (Helliwell, 2003), e.g., people with higher relative incomes have been found
to show signicantly higher measures of subjective well-being (Diener, Suh, Lucas,
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and Smith, 1999). It could also be true that these ambiguous results were due to a
non-linear relation between SWB and income: \Theory and some previous research
suggest that the eects of individual and national incomes may be non-linear in na-
ture, with smaller well-being eects attached to increases in income beyond levels set
by each individual's or society's expectations and habits" (Helliwell, 2003, p. 344).
Another relevant empirical nding is that social capital levels are generally pos-
itively correlated with human capital levels, both at the individual and aggregate
level. This nding is strongly supported, for example, in Putnam's (2000) investi-
gations based of US state-level data. The literature has also discussed a few causal
links between these two forms of capital. Goldin and Katz (1999) have identied
community-level social capital to be the primary determinant of the timing of in-
troduction and the current extent of public education provision across the US. In
individual data, the positive empirical relation between social and human capital has
been conrmed, among others, by Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) and Helli-
well and Putnam (2007). Hence, empirical studies preoccupied with identication of
the impact of social capital on economic performance, such as our companion paper
(Growiec and Growiec, 2011), control for human capital levels in all the relevant re-
gressions. Social capital accumulation is also correlated with occupational categories.
In particular, according to Burt (2005), most bridging social capital is accumulated
by managers; K. Growiec (2011), based on Polish data, nds this for supervisors and
entrepreneurs. A few specic jobs have also been identied as the ones where so-
cial capital has particularly high returns, e.g., physicians, clergymen, and policemen
(Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote, 2002).
2.5 Dynamic mechanisms generating multiple equilibria
The fth strand of literature which we relate to deals with dynamic models with
non-convexities. Such models are able to generate multiple equilibria and/or poverty
traps in economic performance, and thus to imply persistent earnings inequality. The
list of potential driving forces behind such non-convexities5 is very long and includes,
among others: threshold externalities in physical capital accumulation or productivity
(Azariadis and Drazen, 1990); social externalities in human capital accumulation, due
to a persistent and nonlinear wedge between social and private returns to education
(Benabou, 1996; Tamura, 2001; Belzil and Hansen, 2002; Davies, 2003; Rangazas,
5See also the discussion in Galor (1996) as well as Acemoglu (2009), Chapter 21.
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2005); borrowing constraints binding for low-income individuals but not high-income
individuals (Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Piketty, 1997; Matsuyama, 2000); borrow-
ing constraints precluding low-income individuals from getting education (Galor and
Zeira, 1993; Moav, 2002); discrete choices of school and occupation (Cardak, 2004;
Fall, 2005); the adoption of consecutive technological vintages in discrete steps (Chari
and Hopenhayn, 1991; Jovanovic, 1998); and a discrete switch from the \traditional"
agriculture-based technology of stagnant economies to the \modern" technology al-
lowing for perpetual growth (cf. Galor, 2010 and references therein).
To our knowledge, the potential of social capital and social trust to generate
multiple equilibria has not been studied in the literature yet.
3 The model
The model presented below is a thoroughly reworked version of the models analyzed in
Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2003) and Growiec and Growiec (2010). There are several
crucial dierences between those two earlier setups and the current one. The most
important novelty of the current paper is the assumption that the ease of forming
new interpersonal contacts (i.e., bridging social capital) is proportional to the pool of
contacts one already has and the pool of people with whom one is not yet acquainted
but might consider being. The size of this pool is in turn determined by the total
number of people in the society and, most importantly, by the level of social trust.
In Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2003), bridging social capital was treated as a ow and
not a stock, and thus that model completely neglected the dynamics of social capital
formation. In Growiec and Growiec (2010), we treated bridging social capital as a
stock, but we assumed that the ease of forming new interpersonal ties was related
only to the amount of acquaintances one already had, thus neglecting one important
source of nonlinearity. We also completely abstracted from the relationship between
social capital and social trust.
In result, both earlier models were purely neoclassical (convex) in nature, which
made them unable to capture the possibility that bridging social capital and social
trust, interacting with one another, could give rise to multiple equilibria. This prop-
erty is, on the other hand, central to the model presented below.
The role of the current model is to describe a mechanism which could show how
bridging social capital and trust may generate multiple equilibria due to a mutually
reinforcing relationship between them (both a \vicious" and a \virtuous" circle, giving
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rise to a low and high equilibrium, respectively), and to relate them to individuals'
earnings and well-being. Such a transmission mechanism can potentially explain the
persistence of dierences in the discussed social variables, and show why they are
capable of forming a serious obstacle in economic development.6
3.1 Setup of the model
Our model economy is populated by individuals who maximize their lifelong sum
of subjective well-being (SWB). Following Helliwell (2003) as well as O'Brien and
Quimby (2006), we presuppose that SWB is composed of (i) consumption, (ii) satis-
faction from social life outside the family, and (iii) other characteristics such as the
evaluation of one's health, satisfaction from family life, and general conditions and
circumstances of life.7 The last component (iii) we consider exogenous to the model
and set aside hereafter (though in reality, it will be correlated with earnings). We are
thus taking a markedly broader view of the maximized objective function to what is
customary in economics { in the discussed framework, individuals derive utility also
from other variables than just consumption. Mathematically, this means that the
instantaneous ow of well-being is given by
SWB = Hcv; (1)
where H is the constant exogenous constituent factor of SWB, c is consumption, and
v is the stock of bridging social capital.  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1) are the exogenous
partial elasticities of SWB with regard to consumption and bridging social capital,
respectively.
To keep things as simple as possible, we neglect the possibility of savings and
physical capital accumulation. Thus, all earnings w are always immediately spent
on consumption and output is not stored across time.8 The production function is
6Jovanovic (1998) divides the explanations of persistent income inequality into three groups: the
ones driven by (i) initial conditions, (ii) random factors, and (iii) compensating dierentials. The
mechanism proposed in this paper falls into the rst group: if the model economy begins with a
one-point distribution of social capital and trust, it will converge to a unique steady state. Also,
for simplicity and clarity of the obtained results, the current investigation unlike the previous ones
concentrates on bridging social capital only, and bonding social capital is disregarded here.
7By general conditions and circumstances of life, we mean housing conditions, congestion in the
place of residence, frequency of problems with neighbors, etc.
8One could argue that social capital accumulation is a form of indirect savings here, however,
because it implies investing in a stock that would yield productive gains in the future, and thus may
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linear in labor (which is the only production factor here), and further augmented by a
positive spillover from bridging social capital. Ignoring also the possibility of human
capital augmentation of labor, we write:
w = c = A`Y v
; (2)
with
`v + `Y = 1; (3)
A being the constant\total factor productivity", `Y denoting the fraction of the total
time endowment spent eectively at work, `v denoting the fraction of time spent on
socializing with people outside of the family, and the parameter  > 0 measuring the
strength of the spillover from bridging social capital to production. The individual's
total time endowment at each instant of time is normalized to unity.
The spillover  is included in the production function since it is argued (cf. Das-
gupta, 2002) that social capital { and in particular bridging social capital (Burt, 2005)
{ facilitates the matching of workers and rms, speeds up information transmission,
and reduces transaction costs and deadweight losses in economic activity. Please note
that this spillover eect is fully internalized by the decision-making individuals: they
treat their social ties with friends and acquaintances both as ends (direct increases
in SWB, with an elasticity ) and (instrumentally) as means for raising the level of
consumption (with an elasticity ).
The assumption that w increases with v, at least upon aggregation, is essential to
the workings of the current model. There exist, however, quite a few alternatives to
the production function assumed in equation (2) which also seem plausible. First, one
may doubt whether the spillover from bridging social capital to production is fully
internalized by individuals. Thus, one could replace (2) with w = A`Y v
, where v is
the average level of bridging social capital in the economy, external to the individuals'
decisions. This would not change our results qualitatively. Second, one could doubt
whether there exists a true spillover from bridging social capital to productivity. In
fact, its apparent presence in individual-level data could also be an artifact of the so-
called \fallacy of composition" (see the discussion in Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005):
bridging social capital may improve the earnings of some individuals only at the ex-
pense of others without having an impact on aggregate productivity. In such case, we
would write w = A`Y (v=v)
 and thus w = A`Y in the symmetric equilibrium. A -
nal possibility is a generalization of our previous ideas, a function w = A`Y v
v that
help smooth consumption intertemporally.
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includes both internal and external eects of bridging social capital on productivity.
Quantitatively, the outcomes of the model will clearly dier depending on the values
of  and . Qualitatively, however, as we shall see shortly, these dierences do not
overturn the main predictions and characteristics of the model, as long as +  6= 0,
i.e. there exists a non-negligible spillover from aggregate bridging social capital to
aggregate productivity. In the light of the empirical ndings of Granovetter (1973),
Burt (2005), among others, we view this as a very plausible assumption. One natural
interpretation of this assumption is that bridging social capital constitutes a part
of \social infrastructure", a component of total factor productivity (Hall and Jones,
1999): it reduces transaction costs, improves the ow of information, facilitates coop-
eration and implementation of innovative ideas, and thus increases TFP by reducing
the extent of input misallocation (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).
Bridging social capital v is modeled as a stock and not as a ow as in Beugelsdijk
and Smulders (2003). In line with intuition, we assume that bridging social capital
might be accumulated through purposeful investments of time { i.e. time spent so-
cializing with friends and acquaintances { and that it depreciates gradually over time
if not enough eort is made to maintain the social ties. We write
_v = `vv(zn  v)  v; (4)
where  > 0 is the returns-to-scale parameter in bridging social capital accumulation
and  > 0 is the depreciation rate of bridging social capital (the rate of natural
decay of social ties). The variable n > 0 captures the total number of people in
the population with whom it is possible to establish social ties if trust permits, and
z 2 [0; 1] is the individual's level of social trust; zn   v is thus the total number of
\eligible" people whom one trusts but with whom she has not established a tie yet.
Hence, the current bridging social capital accumulation function parallels the as-
sumptions of the logistic diusion model (cf. Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005): the in-
crements to bridging social capital are proportional both to the current stock of this
variable and the remaining pool of trusted people zn   v. An important feature of
this model is that it oers a positive long-run equilibrium (steady state) only if time
investments `v and the total pool of trusted people zn are large enough. Otherwise,
it predicts gradual decay of social ties.
It is important to note here that n does not just capture the raw number of
people in the population. What actually matters for each particular individual is
the number of people who could potentially establish social ties with her, or total
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population scaled by an appropriate societal measure of social distance. This deni-
tion corresponds directly to the classical Bogardus (1926) Social Distance Scale. The
social distance measured by the Bogardus Scale captures individuals' willingness to
participate in social contacts with members of diverse social groups, such as other
racial and ethnic groups, sex oenders, and homosexuals.9 Alternative scales of social
distance which could be used in an empirical operationalization of n include, among
others, sociometric measures of frequency of contact/interaction with members of ap-
propriately dened outgroups. The result on such a scale tells how open a society is,
or equivalently, how strong the prejudice toward out-groupers is there. Other issues
which could potentially aect the value of n are: mobility, diversity of the society
(measured partially by ethno-linguistic fractionalization), and the general cultural
background in the society, governing the average individual's \exogenous" willingness
to form social ties with others, irrespective of their characteristics, such as e.g. the
tradition of hospitality.10
Assuming a constant discount rate  > 0 and using (1) and (2), the individual's
subjective well-being (SWB) maximization problem is the following:
max
f`v(t)g+1t=0
Z +1
0
HA(1  `v)v+e tdt s.t. _v = `vv(zn  v)  v: (5)
In the following analysis, we will assume social trust z to be constant and exoge-
nous. Later on, we will relax this assumption and discuss the consequences.11
9The scale asks people to point the degree of closeness they wish to maintain with members of a
given diverse social group. The degrees of closeness are: marrying one's daughter/son, being one's
personal friend, being one's neighbor on the same street, being a co-worker in the same occupation,
being a citizen of one's country, being only a visitor in one's country, and wishing to exclude this
person from one's country. The Bogardus Scale implies that the possible attitudes toward the out-
groupers span a continuum, from exclusion from the country, to close relations via marriage. It also
implies that if you accept an out-grouper as a spouse of your child, you must also accept out-groupers
as neighbors, co-workers, etc.
10Under an alternative interpretation, n can also be viewed as the Dunbar's (1993) constant. This
author has argued that due to the construction of human brain, the maximum number of stable,
coherent social ties that a person can eectively maintain is approximately 150.
11Regarding empirical tests of the current model, one has to keep in mind that in reality, social
trust might also change for reasons unrelated to social capital. Knack and Keefer (1997) document
that social trust has been declining in the US throughout 1950{1990. In the same period, however,
the US society has been growing in number and increasing its mobility, both these factors being
captured by an increasing n.
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3.2 The dynamic equations
To solve this intertemporal optimization problem, one should apply the standard
optimal control approach. The associated Hamiltonian reads:
H = HA(1  `v)v+e t + [`vv(zn  v)  v]: (6)
From this, and with the assumptions that H, A and z are constant over time, the
dynamic equation for `v, i.e. the evolution of optimal time investment in bridging
social capital over time, is derived as:
_`
v = `v
0@+ (+  + vzn v )  `v (zn  v)(+ )

1 + 


1 `v
`v

1  + (1  ) `v
1 `v
1A : (7)
The transversality condition limt!1 (t)v(t) = 0 is automatically satised because
the dynamics of (t) are dominated by the vanishing term e t and the stock of
bridging social capital v(t) is bounded. This, coupled with the equation of motion of
the stock of bridging social capital
_v = `vv(zn  v)  v; (8)
completes the description of the dynamics. Let us now proceed to the description of
the steady state.
3.3 Interior steady state: conditions for existence and unique-
ness
The model meets the usual concavity requirements for an interior maximum (see
Appendix A.2) and it possesses a unique interior steady state such that _`v = _v = 0
with v 2 (0; zn), provided that the unit eciency of social capital formation and/or
the pool of trusted people is large enough. More precisely, it is the case if the steady
state level of time investment in social capital `v exceeds a certain pivotal value:
`v >


zn
1=
 `pivv : (9)
The condition above is equivalent to the condition @ _v
@v

v=0
> 0, i.e., that if the indi-
vidual has zero social capital, it is benecial for her to accumulate it.
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Provided that the condition (9) holds, one can insert the steady-state relationship
v = zn  
`v
into (7) with the restriction _`v = 0. The steady state is then computed
as the implicit solution `v to the equation:
'(`v) = zn`
+1
v +



(+ ) +   

`v   

(+ ) = 0: (10)
As stated in the following propositions, a solution to '(`v) = 0 is guaranteed to
exist only in a certain parameter range:
Proposition 1 Equation (10) has a unique solution `v 2 (0; 1) provided that zn +
 >  and that the inequality (9) holds.
Proposition 2 The condition (9) is equivalent to the inequality
`pivv =


zn
1=
<


(+ )
+ 

(+ )
: (11)
In words, this means that for an interior solution to exist { so that there could be
a positive stock of bridging social capital in the long run { forming social ties must
be \suciently easy". This in turn requires that either the total pool of people with
whom social ties could be potentially formed n is large enough, or so is the\eciency"
of social capital formation , or so is social trust z. The last option is most relevant
to our study and will be exploited more in the following paragraphs.
3.4 Comparative statics of the steady state
In the above section, we have presented the conditions under which an interior steady
state exists and is unique. Unfortunately, due to the statement of the problem, we are
unable to derive a closed-form solution for `v and v
. It is however straightforward
to compute the relevant comparative statics using the implicit function theorem.
Two parameters of crucial importance for the properties of the model are: the
amount of social trust z and the spillover parameter  measuring the pecuniary bene-
ts of individuals' bridging social capital.12 We obtain the following results regarding
these two parameters.
12Obviously, one could also compute comparative statics with regard to other parameters of the
model, such as n;A; , or . These results are however not directly conducive to the workings of our
model, so we do not present them here. They are available from the authors upon request.
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Proposition 3 The steady state level of bridging social capital v increases with so-
cial trust z, but the share of time devoted to social capital accumulation `v decreases
with z.
The interpretation of this result is the following: social trust gives rise to both
substitution and wealth eects { if one nds others more trustworthy than before,
it becomes easier and quicker for her both (1) to establish more social ties (wealth
eect) and (2) to maintain a xed level of social capital with less eort, leaving more
time for productive work (substitution eect). In our current setup, the substitution
eect outweighs the wealth eect, thereby implying a negative relationship between
the intensity of social capital accumulation and social trust.
As far as the equilibrium level of individuals' bridging social capital v is con-
cerned, the above two eects are augmented with one more eect, a direct positive
one: more social trust provides direct increases to the pool of people with whom one
could get acquainted. This eect dominates the two indirect eects (i.e., via the equi-
librium level of time investment in social capital, `v), and hence the total impact of
social trust on equilibrium level of bridging social capital is unambiguously positive.13
Since the impact of social trust z on social capital v is positive at the steady
state, its impact on average earnings w = A(1  `v)(v) and subjective well-being
SWB = HA(1  `v)(v)+ is positive as well:
@w
@z

v=v
= w
 
  1
1  `v
@`v
@z

`v=`v
+

v
@v
@z

v=v
!
> 0; (12)
@SWB
@z

v=v
= SWB
 
  
1  `v
@`v
@z

`v=`v
+
+ 
v
@v
@z

v=v
!
> 0: (13)
The dependence of the steady state (`v; v
) on the spillover parameter  can be
summarized as follows.
Proposition 4 The spillover parameter  relates positively both to the equilibrium
time investment in social capital formation `v and to the social capital level v
.
The interpretation of this result is the following. The larger the spillover parameter
, i.e., the larger is the positive impact of one's stock of bridging social capital on
13Testing this prediction empirically is possible (e.g. Growiec and Growiec, 2011) but requires one
to distinguish between empirical measures of social capital (a characteristic of social networks) and
social trust (a concept of social norms). Unfortunately, these two distinct ideas are often convoluted
in the economic literature on social capital and economic performance.
15
her earnings, the more social capital will be accumulated, and the more time will be
devoted to its accumulation. As opposed to the relationship between trust and social
capital investment, there is no substitution eect at work here, inducing people to
shift their time allocations towards work. Trust makes it easier to establish social
ties; the spillover  makes it more protable. This leads to dierent impacts on their
incentives in each of the two cases.
3.5 Two equilibria
As noted above, the existence of an interior steady state with a positive level of
bridging social capital hinges on the crucial assumption (9) (or equivalently, (11))
which states that the level of social trust should be suciently high:

zn
1=
<


(+ )
+ 

(+ )
, z >
 
+ 

(+ )


(+ )
!

n
 zpiv: (14)
Furthermore, if z is indeed high enough to meet the condition (14), then by transver-
sality conditions of the dynamic optimization problem, convergence to the positive
steady state (`v; v
) is guaranteed, and thus there will for sure be a positive amount
of bridging social capital in the long run if only v(0) > 0. Even more importantly,
from the comparative statics exercise we learn that the higher is the level of social
trust, the more social capital will eventually be accumulated.
If, however, the level of social trust z fails to satisfy the above condition, then we
will observe a sustained decline in bridging social capital, leading to a zero value of
this variable in the long run, irrespective of v(0). This leads to the announced result
of two equilibria (a corner and an interior one), indexed by the (exogenous) level of
social trust z.
For a numerical representation of the above statements, please consult Figure 1.
As far as the empirical content of the current multiple-equilibria result is con-
cerned, it should be noted that its foremost implication { that there should be discrete
gaps in cross-country distributions of social trust and bridging social capital stocks
{ holds here only conditional on parameter values. These values might be country-
specic, however, and thus a reliable empirical verication of this prediction of the
current model would require using panel data, whereby the validity (or invalidity) of
the cross-country predictions of the current model could be identied thanks to the
temporal dimension of the data. Unfortunately, we are not aware of existence of any
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Figure 1: The dependence of the steady state (`v; v
) on social trust z.
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Notes: parameters used to produce this gure:  = 0:6; n = 1;  = 0:06;  = 0:5;  = 0:25;  =
0:3;  = 0:4;  = 0:1. The implied critical value of social trust z above which an interior steady
state exists satises zpiv = 0:26639. The relationships presented in this gure are in agreement with
Proposition 3.
panel datasets containing applicable measures of bridging social capital. In result,
our theory must remain speculative in this respect for a while.
3.6 The inverse U-shaped relationship between bridging so-
cial capital, earnings, and well-being
When the economy nds itself in the interior equilibirium (`v; v
), which is the case if
z > zpiv as dened in (14), then the levels of earnings w and SWB are also uniquely
determined. They are then simply a function of the underlying level of social trust and
other parameters of the model. If these other parameters are xed, then everything is
pinned down by the underlying level of social trust z. In particular, because `v; v
; w
and SWB depend positively on trust, the steady-state relationship between bridging
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social capital and earnings is unambiguously positive, too, and so is the steady-state
relationship between bridging social capital and subjective well-being.
As it has been done in Growiec and Growiec (2010) in the case of a convex model
of social capital formation, we may however trace the out-of-equilibrium pattern of
dependence between the investment in bridging social capital, and earnings and well-
being. It turns out not to be monotonic and follow an inverse U-shape. The following
propositions hold.
Proposition 5 For a given level of social trust z 2 (zpiv; 1], the relationship between
bridging social capital and earnings in the vicinity of the interior steady state is inverse
U-shaped: at low levels of bridging social capital, it increases earnings; at high levels,
it decreases them. In the steady state, individuals invest less time in bridging social
capital accumulation than is required to maximize instantaneous earnings, provided
that
'


 + 

< 0; (15)
where the function ' has been dened in (10). Conversely, individuals invest more
time in bridging social capital accumulation than is required to maximize instanta-
neous earnings if the sign in inequality (15) is reversed.
Proposition 6 For a given level of social trust z 2 (zpiv; 1], the relationship between
bridging social capital and well-being in the vicinity of the interior steady state is
inverse U-shaped: at low levels of bridging social capital, it increases well-being; at
high levels, it decreases them. In the steady state, individuals invest less time in
bridging social capital accumulation than is required to maximize instantaneous well-
being.
The above nding, that the out-of-equilibrium relationship between bridging so-
cial capital and individuals' earnings and well-being is inverse U-shaped, parallels the
one put forward in Growiec and Growiec (2010). One must keep in mind two impor-
tant dierences though. Firstly, the relationship was treated as unconditional in the
previous study, whereas here it is conditional on the level of social trust. As we have
already argued, as the level of trust increases, bridging social capital, earnings and
well-being go hand in hand instead of following and inverse U-shape.
Secondly, the above propositions are only valid in the vicinity of the interior steady
state. If the economy nds itself in a corner equilibrium with z  zpiv, or if there
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are multiple interior equilibria (discussed below), then the proposed inverse U-shaped
relationship will break.
The current nding parallels also the inverse U-shaped relationship between ge-
netic diversity and development, identied by Ashraf and Galor (2012). These authors
have shown that diversity reduces trust, social capital and cooperation, but enhances
innovation. Extremely high or low levels of genetic diversity are thus detrimental to
economic development, whereas intermediate values of diversity provide most favor-
able conditions for development.
3.7 Dynamics
The dynamics of the model, summarized by equations (7){(8), can be summarized
in a sequence of phase diagrams. There are two cases which ought to be analyzed
separately, namely that of z > zpiv where an interior steady state exists, and that of
z  zpiv where social capital will gradually decay to zero.
In both cases, the _v = 0 locus in the (v; `v) space (`v located on the vertical axis),
is given as a graph of the function (see eq. (8)):
`v = #(v) =


(zn  v)
1=
: (16)
It is therefore increasing for all v, begins at #(0) = `piv, and converges to a vertical
asymptote as v ! zn.
The _`v = 0 locus is, on the other hand, identied as the zero contour of the
bivariate function
(`v; v) = +

+  +
v
zn  v

  `v (zn v)(+)

1 +



1  `v
`v

: (17)
From the implicit function theorem, it is derived that the _`v = 0 locus is unam-
biguously downward sloping in the (v; `v) space:
@`v
@v

=0
=  
@
@v

=0
@
@`v

=0
< 0: (18)
Furthermore, it can be easily shown that for v ! zn, it must be the case that `v ! 0
for the condition  = 0 (eq. 17) to hold. Finally, we nd that for v = 0, the
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Figure 2: Phase diagram of the model with an interior steady state.
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Notes: parameters used to produce this gure:  = 0:6; z = 1; n = 1;  = 0:06;  = 0:5;  = 0:25;  =
0:3;  = 0:4;  = 0:1. Implied steady state satises: `v = 0:1572, v
 = 0:628. The condition (11) as
well as the second order conditions (37) and (42) jointly hold.
corresponding value `0v along the
_`
v = 0 locus is larger than `
piv if and only if the
inequality (14) holds (i.e., if social trust z exceeds the threshold value zpiv).14
Knowing the behavior of the _v = 0 and _`v = 0 loci, the dynamics of the two-
dimensional system can be analyzed in phase diagrams, depicted in Figures 2{3. In
Figure 2, we see that if an interior steady state exists, it is saddle-path stable and
there exists a unique approach path, which will for sure be taken as it is the only one
which satises the transversality condition. The saddle path is downward sloping,
indicating that an individual who starts o with a low level of social capital (has a
few acquaintances only) will initially invest more time in social capital formation that
she will do in the long run, and vice versa.
14Since  is an increasing function of v, the considered condition is equivalent to (`piv; 0) < 0
which, after the necessary algebra, boils down to (14).
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Figure 3: Phase diagram of the model without an interior steady state.
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Notes: parameters used to produce this gure:  = 0:6; z = 0:2; n = 1;  = 0:06;  = 0:5;  =
0:25;  = 0:3; 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does not hold (indicating that there cannot exist an interior steady state), but the second order
conditions (19) and (37) hold.
On the other hand, if z  zpiv then the model implies a gradual decay of social
ties (Figure 3), whose stock will tend to zero over the long run. In such case, the
transversality condition imposes a further requirement on parameter values:
lim
t!1
_(t)
(t)
= (1    )   < 0: (19)
3.8 Endogenizing social trust: threshold externalities and
multiple interior equilibria
The model discussed until this point assumed an exogenous, constant level of so-
cial trust, captured by the parameter z 2 [0; 1]. We would like to endogenize this
parameter now, but in such case a few issues must be discussed rst.
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First of all, the amount of social trust cannot grow without bound: by construc-
tion, the highest possible level for this variable is z = 1 where each individual trusts
everyone in the population and is ready to establish social ties with anyone else. Since
steady-state earnings and subjective well-being uniformly increase with trust at all
levels of this variable, it is concluded that earnings and well-being are maximized for
z = 1. Hence, low trust might be a barrier to economic convergence in this model { a
country with less trust will converge to a lower steady state than a country with more
trust { and accumulating trust can help speed up convergence by shifting the country
to approach paths of ever higher steady states, but trust cannot drive long-run growth
here because it is bounded from above. This makes the current model applicable to
the discussion on the catalysts and inhibitors of convergence, but not to the debate
on sources of growth.15
Secondly, long-run levels of earnings and well-being are functions of the steady-
state equilibrium values of social capital and social capital investment in the model,
and social capital variables are in turn dependent on the magnitude of social trust z.
Social trust should, however, be endogenized because it is argued in the literature that
social ties with people outside of one's family tend to increase general trust. Both in
our model and in reality, a reverse causal link from trust to social capital formation
might be also active, giving rise to a feedback loop of simultaneous co-dependence
between these two variables.
Thirdly, social trust might change for reasons unrelated to the mechanisms dis-
15Social trust z could drive long-run growth if it were not uniformly bounded from above, though.
For instance, instead of taking the natural restriction z  1 we could request that zn  N , where
n is the population \eligible" for establishing social ties and N is total population (or some other
arbitrary upper bound for zn). We could then x n but request N to grow unboundedly with time
and allow z to follow it. A possible interpretation for the current case, in which z grows over time
given n (so that z and not n drives long-run growth), would be that as total population grows larger,
people can select the group of people \eligible" for establishing social connections more adequately,
and thus they can trust such acquaintances more. Under some additional technical assumptions,
according to equation (4), the number of social ties per person v would then grow unboundedly
over time. Consumption and output would follow, and thus we would observe endogenous growth.
In reality, however, the number of social ties per person cannot be unboundedly expanding over
time: people are born with no social ties outside family and all their social ties disappear when
they die. Our aggregative model abstracts from nite lifetimes of individuals, though. Keeping
this in mind, and having noted that there is no externality in equation (4), i.e. v is the individual
number of social ties, we can apply the argument developed by Growiec (2010) here and demonstrate
that accounting for nite lifetimes in our model would eliminate the currently discussed endogenous
growth possibility. We can thus safely rule this case out from our present considerations.
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cussed in the current article: changes in the strength of institutions (e.g., enforcing
contracts and property rights), changes in the ethnic, cultural, and income structure
of the society, or shifts in attitudes, caused e.g. by technological change. All these
issues must be properly accounted for in empirical studies.
Keeping these caveats in mind, we note that there exist multiple ways of con-
ditioning social trust z on the stock of bridging social capital v. For example, if
one imposed a constant-elasticity spillover of v as in z = v, this would lead to
a unique interior steady state (`v; v
) irrespective of v(0), and of the magnitude of
z(0) { thereby removing the threshold eect present in the original model where trust
needs to be suciently large for the interior steady state to be reached.
Consequently, in line with the primary hypothesis of the paper, we would like to
link these two variables in a non-convex way, leading to multiple interior equilibria
due to threshold externalities (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990). The simplest way to do
so is to assume that people's trust can be either high or low, depending whether their
current stock of bridging social capital exceeds a threshold value v or not:
z =
8<:z1; v  v;z2; v > v; (20)
where z1 < z2 and v satises the inequality v

1 < v < v

2, with v

i denoting the steady
state value of bridging social capital v if social trust equals zi; i = 1; 2. Furthermore,
if z1 < z
piv, then the lower steady state has zero bridging social capital.
The interpretation of the current model is the following: one will generally trust
others (high z) only provided that she is currently acquainted with suciently many
people; if her stock of acquaintances falls short of the threshold, one would rather
refuse to trust others (low z). The eect is non-linear here because our model as-
sumes equality between individuals, and trust is a social phenomenon which builds
on reciprocity (Simmel, 1950).
From the above analysis of model dynamics it follows that in the generalized model
with a threshold externality of form (20), under the assumption z1 > z
piv, we observe
the following regularities:
 If v(0) < v1 then v will increase over time until it reaches the low equilibrium
v1. `v will decrease over time until it reaches `

v;1.
 If v1 < v(0) < v then v will decrease over time until it reaches the low equilib-
rium v1. `v will increase over time until it reaches `

v;1.
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Figure 4: Phase diagram of the model with a threshold externality on social trust.
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 If v < v(0) < v2 then v will increase over time until it reaches the high equilib-
rium v2. `v will decrease over time until it reaches `

v;2 < `

v;1.
 If v2 < v(0) then v will decrease over time until it reaches the high equilibrium
v2. `v will increase over time until it reaches `

v;2 < `

v;1.
The model therefore gives rise to multiple interior equilibria (see Figure 4). The
choice of equilibrium converged upon depends on the initial stock of bridging social
capital, v(0).
Of course, the positive dependence of social trust on bridging social can be modeled
in dierent, smoother ways, but as long as the dependence is suciently non-convex,
the above result goes through. More importantly, it does not hinge on the assumption
that the level of social trust is external, established after the agents have decided on
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their dynamic paths of social capital formation. Although the level of social trust in
the society { i.e., how much trust we can expect to get from others { can indeed be
plausibly modeled as a threshold externality and treating it this way favors occurrence
of multiple equilibria, it does not need to be viewed as an externality for multiple
equilibria to appear. Indeed, even if the agents fully internalize the impact of their
decisions on the equilibrium level of social trust in the society, so that they directly
insert z = z(v) in their optimization problem, multiple equilibria can still potentially
occur provided that z(v) is suciently non-convex.16
3.9 Introducing economic growth
As we already mentioned above, the current model can be used in analyses of the
impact of bridging social capital and social trust on the long-run level of economic
development. To make it applicable to economic questions of long-run growth and
convergence, one should however generalize it and incorporate some mechanism of
unbounded economic growth.
The simplest way to achieve this goal is to assume that \total factor productivity"
(TFP), i.e., the factor A in (2), grows exogenously at a rate of g > 0: A(t) = A0e
gt.
Growth in A should then be incorporated in the individuals' optimization problems,
partially counterbalancing the psychological discount rate . In this simplest case,
the total impact of TFP growth on the dynamic evolution of social capital formation
will actually consist in substituting  with    g wherever the former appeared in
equations (7){(8), as long as g < . Otherwise, an unwelcome possibility would appear
that aggregate discounted subjective well-being diverges to innity, invalidating the
integrability condition.
Hence, the introduction of TFP growth lowers the eective discount rate. In
result, the following proposition holds (if an interior steady state exists):
Proposition 7 The higher is TFP growth rate g, or the lower is the discount rate
, the more time will be allocated to social capital accumulation in the interior steady
state (`v), and the more bridging social capital will be there in the long-run equilibrium
(v).
16As a numerical example, we have found multiple equilibria to occur in the case of a logistic
function z(v) = z2
1+

z1
z2 z1
 v v
v
which satises z(0) = z1, limv!1 z(v) = z2 > z1, and has its unique
inection point at v. The results are available from the authors upon request.
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In words, if individuals are more patient, or if there is faster growth in their
productivity, they are also more willing to postpone consumption until later. Also
the extra gains requested by them to do so are relatively smaller. The logic behind
this nding is the following. Firstly, steady-state levels of subjective well-being and
earnings are positively related to the amount of bridging social capital, so in the
long run it pays to have more of it. Secondly, accumulating social capital requires
time, and time invested in forming social ties must be subtracted from the amount if
time spent on productive work which gives instant gratication. In result, the more
patient are the individuals, the more time they spend on socializing with friends and
acquaintances at the expense of earning for immediate consumption.
The important lesson here is that under exogenous TFP growth, levels of social
capital will converge to the interior steady state, whereas consumption and earnings
will grow at the balanced rate g.
Economic growth might also be linked to social trust in the considered model, how-
ever. Indeed, international evidence (e.g., Zak and Knack, 2001; Algan and Cahuc,
2010) suggests that wealthier societies are, on average, more willing to trust others
{ and vice versa. The social trust variable z may thus be related to A according to
some increasing function. If we assume, for example,
z = 1  
A
; A(0) > ; (21)
then it is implied that z ! 1 as A ! 1 with time. Hence, the initial lack of social
trust is only a temporary obstacle in economic convergence, one which gets less and
less severe in the course of economic development and disappears in the long run. This
means that in the current case, economic growth serves to alleviate the problem of
low social trust. There is no multiplicity of equilibria: both the long-run equilibrium
is uniquely given (for z = 1), and the approach path towards it.
It is important whether z can take any value in the interval (0; 1), as in the
aforementioned example, or is bounded from above by some z < 1. In the latter case,
economic growth helps alleviate some of the negative eect of insucient bridging
social capital and trust, but not all of it, so a distrustful society still cannot fully
converge in terms of economic development to a trusting one.
It must be therefore emphasized that for low social trust to constitute a long-term
obstacle to economic convergence, it must not depend on the level of economic devel-
opment in a monotonic and unbounded way.17 Only in such case it is possible for the
17This nding parallels the situation discussed at length in the case of unied growth models (see
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vicious circle of low bridging social capital and low social trust to work forever; oth-
erwise, its workings will be counteracted, and eventually alleviated, by the increasing
level of economic development.
3.10 Introducing heterogeneity: bridging social capital and
employment
One further caveat with the model in the form developed in previous subsections is
that it ignores the possibility that the population might be stratied according to some
socio-economic dimension, generating dierences in social trust, earnings potential,
ability to form and maintain social ties with dissimilar others, etc. A prime example
of such a dimension is employment status: some people are working, some are not.18
The optimization problems of the employed and the non-employed can easily be
modelled dierently from one another, though. First, the type of productive work
which the non-employed might consider performing { home production { is typically
less productive than wage work. Second, at the social margin, home production
does not provide access to such social networks as employment does, and thus the
accumulation of bridging social capital should be hampered in the case of the non-
employed. Third, the spillover from bridging social capital to individuals' earnings
should be hampered as well: knowing people does not improve the productivity of
home production but it might improve the earnings from paid work due to the benets
of cooperation, facilitated information ow, etc. (cf. Podolny and Baron, 1997;
Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005; Burt, 2005).
In consequence, analyzing the dierences between the cases of the employed and
the non-employed enables us to draw important conclusions on the interaction be-
tween the mechanism discussed throughout this paper and the employment rate in
an economy. A corollary will be that, just like we argue in Growiec and Growiec
(2011), one possible way to eradicate the low bridging social capital{low trust trap is
Acemoglu, 2009, Chapter 21; and Galor, 2010, and references therein), where economies are faced
with a shift from a \traditional" to a \modern" technology. A \traditional" economy can potentially
converge with a \modern" economy there only after it has fully adopted the modern technology as
well. Neoclassical convergence mechanisms are at work, both there and here, only if both countries
share the same technology. The key dierence is the relabeling of variables.
18Yet, there are also other dimensions of heterogeneity which may be relevant in this respect. Just
to name a few: race and ethnicity (e.g., Alesina and la Ferrara, 2000), strength of family ties (e.g.,
Alesina and Giuliano, 2010), human capital and occupational category (e.g., Glaeser, Laibson and
Sacerdote, 2002), sex, size of town of residence, etc.
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to provide strong enough increases in labor market participation. This could expose
signicantly more people to interactions with strangers and engage them in social
learning with the ultimate lesson being that the non-kin could be trusted too, and
that it is good to meet socially with people dissimilar to ourselves (Li, Pickles and
Savage, 2005; Glanville and Paxton, 2007).
Our approach to capturing dierences between the employed and the non-employed
is the following. We shall assume that each employed person faces the optimization
problem described in (5), and hence, provided that their level of trust z > zpiv, their
investment rate and stock of bridging social capital will converge to the unique inte-
rior steady state (`v; v
). Non-employed persons, on the other hand, face a slightly
modied optimization problem. Since they cannot consider colleagues from work as
their potential new social ties, the pool of people with whom they can socialize is
restricted. We assume that in their case, it is not zn but zn, with  2 (0; 1). Anal-
ogously, we assume that their earnings from home production are positive but lower
than those attainable in the market sector. We impose that their earnings are equal
to:
wU = A
(1  `v);  2 (0; 1): (22)
Hence, there are two dierences between the earnings obtained from home production
and from wage work: (i) the former ones are lowered by a xed factor  < 1, and (ii)
in that case, there is no positive spillover from bridging social capital to earnings .
Under the conditions    zn <  and
`pivv;U =


zn
1=
<



+ 


; (23)
guaranteeing that a unique interior steady state exists, the results are as follows.
Proposition 8 Employed persons have an unambiguously higher steady-state level
of bridging social capital than non-employed ones: v > vU . The amounts of time
spent on social capital accumulation by the employed and non-employed cannot be
unambiguously ordered. They are higher for the employed (`v > `

v;U) if and only if
the spillover from bridging social capital and wages of the employed is strong enough:
 >
zn(`v)
+1
(1  `v)
(1  ): (24)
As a corollary from this proposition, we note that if  = 1, i.e., the pool of potential
acquaintances is equally large for both considered groups, then the non-employed
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Figure 5: The dependence of the steady state (`v; v
) on social trust z: comparison
of the situation of the employed and the non-employed.
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Notes: parameters used to produce this gure:  = 0:6; n = 1;  = 0:06;  = 0:5;  = 0:25;  =
0:3;  = 0:4;  = 0:1;  = 0:8. The implied critical value of social trust z above which an interior
steady state exists satises zpiv = 0:26639. For the non-employed, it is zpivU = 0:3798. The relation-
ships presented in this gure are in agreement with Proposition 3. In the long-run equilibrium, the
non-employed spend less hours socializing than the employed do, irrespective of the level of social
trust z in the society. They also possess less bridging social capital. Their earnings in equilibrium
are less than those of the employed only if inequality (26) holds, which implies that  < piv(z). In
the numerical example, piv(z) is an increasing function.
devote unambiguously less time to social capital formation than the employed (`v >
`v;U); and if  = 0, i.e., there is no positive impact of a larger stock of bridging social
capital on individuals' earnings, then the relationship is reversed (`v < `

v;U). This is
because in each of those two cases, one of the two counteracting channels { lowered
ability to form social ties, or the impossibility to improve earnings via social ties {
is shut down. If both these mechanisms are at work, then the net result depends on
their relative strength, captured by  and , respectively. A numerical example (see
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Figure 5) shows that the non-employed will generally spend less time socializing with
acquaintances in equilibrium even if  is reasonably large.
It can also be easily shown that equilibrium earnings of the non-employed, wU and
their subjective well-being depend positively on social trust z. The proof is analogous
the ones presented for the case of the employed.
Let us now pass to the question of determination of the level of total output in
the society and the aggregate level of well-being. We will now condition these two
aggregate statistics on (i) the share of the employed in the society, and (ii) the societal
level of social trust.
Under the assumption that goods produced in the market sector and within home
production are perfect substitutes, output per worker can be computed as
y = A

"(1  `v)(v) + (1  ")(1  `v;U)

(25)
where " 2 [0; 1] captures the share of the employed in total population.
As both w and wU increase with social trust z, we conclude that y increases
with z as well: more social trust implies a higher level of output in the economy,
irrespective of the employment rate. The same result carries forward directly to
aggregate well-being, under the (empirically falsied) assumption that H is constant
across individuals.
Let us now proceed to the analysis of the impact of the labor participation rate
on total output and well-being in the economy. We have:
@y
@"
= A
 
(1  `v)(v)   (1  `v;U)

> 0 (26)
,  < piv(z) 
 
1  `v(z)
1  `v;U(z)
!
(v(z)):
and hence, total output increases with employment rate if:
 the parameter  is small enough, i.e., the relative productivity of the non-
employed is low enough,
 the steady-state stock of bridging social capital of the employed v is high
enough,
 the spillover  from bridging social capital to earnings of the employed is weak
enough (if  satises (24), then `v;U > `

v so the left-hand side formula is greater
than one, validating the inequality).
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It must be noted that the inequality condition (26) is very weak, especially if the
considered population n is suciently large (and thus the steady-state bridging social
capital level v is suciently high), so we expect it to be satised under all\reasonable"
parametrizations of the model. It is already satised in our benchmark numerical
example presented in Figure 5.
Naturally, the proposed dimension of heterogeneity { employed vs. non-employed {
is not the only one which could be incorporated in the above model. This example was
given only because of its important interpretation and empirical relevance. Adding
further dimensions of heterogeneity into the model is a very promising avenue for
further research, for two reasons. Firstly, the more empirical regularities related to
social capital, trust, and economic performance of individuals are accounted for in the
model, the better our understanding of the discussed mechanisms, especially that it is
a well-established empirical fact that these three variables are correlated with, among
others, individuals' human capital, occupational category, sex, race and ethnicity.
Secondly and even more importantly, heterogeneity in itself is a powerful source for
generating multiple equilibria as well. In the current model, their existence is a con-
sequence of the non-convexity in social capital accumulation as well as the threshold
mechanism between social capital and trust; numerous scholars have shown, however,
that it can also be generated by endogenous stratication mechanisms within het-
erogenous societies (cf. Galor, 1996; Acemoglu, 2009, Ch. 21). One potential idea
would be to allow for some xed costs, e.g., analogously to Galor and Zeira (1993),
but this time, either in the accumulation of social capital or in the production of
individual trust. Coupled with sucient individual heterogeneity (for instance in the
initial income distribution), they may also give rise to poverty traps. Another possi-
bility would be to introduce convex saving functions, associated to some imperfections
(Moav, 2002).19
4 Conclusion
Let us now wrap all above ndings together. Most generally, the contribution of
the current paper to the literature has been to put forward a model formalizing a
novel mechanism where bridging social capital and social trust feed back on each
other, creating either a \vicious" or a \virtuous" circle depending on initial conditions,
capable of generating poverty traps and multiple equilibria in economic development
19We are grateful to the anonymous Referee for pointing out these interesting possibilities.
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thanks to a non-convexity in the process of social capital formation.
More specically, we have argued that:
 whether there will be multiple equilibria or not, depends on the underlying
initial level of social trust;
 low enough initial levels of social trust push the economy towards a poverty
trap;
 steady-state levels of bridging social capital, trust, earnings, and subjective
well-being are positively related, but the steady-state amount of time devoted
to social capital accumulation decreases with social trust;
 the out-of-equilibrium relationship between bridging social capital and earnings
(or subjective well-being) is inverse U-shaped;
 if the initial level of social trust is high enough, individuals who start o with
low levels of bridging social capital will initially invest more time in social capital
creation that they will do in the long run, and vice versa;
 if the initial level of social trust is low enough, then the model implies a gradual
decay of social ties, whose stock will tend to zero over the long run;
 there might also be multiple interior equilibria if one incorporates a bi-directional
feedback eect between social capital and social trust in the model;
 in a growing economy, low social trust constitutes a persistent obstacle to eco-
nomic convergence only if it does not depend on the level of economic develop-
ment; otherwise, its workings will be counteracted, and eventually alleviated,
by the increasing level of economic development;
 employed persons should have unambiguously higher steady-state levels of bridg-
ing social capital than the non-employed individuals, with all its impacts on
social trust, earnings, and subjective well-being.
What remains to be done is to carry out quantitative empirical tests of the nu-
merous predictions of the model. Admittedly, its workings are in agreement with a
wide array of contributions in sociology and social psychology, but their \goodness of
t" has been evaluated qualitatively rather than quantitatively. One step in this di-
rection has been taken in our companion paper, Growiec and Growiec (2011), where
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we nd corroborating evidence for the hypothesized mechanism in individual-level
(World Values Survey) cross-sectional data for Central and Eastern European coun-
tries. The literature is still in need for a wider coverage of countries and the use of
panel datasets, though.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. The function ' is continuous for all `v 2 [0; 1]. Further-
more, we have:
'(0) =  

(+ ) < 0
'(1) = zn+    > 0
where the last inequality holds by assumption. From the Darboux property of contin-
uous functions, there must exist at least one solution `v 2 (0; 1) such that '(`v) = 0.
The second derivative of ' is
'00(`v) = zn(1 + )` 1v > 0;
indicating that ' is strictly convex and thus the solution `v is unique. 
Proof of Proposition 2. From (10), it can be easily seen that the condition `v > `
piv
v
is equivalent to the request that '(`pivv ) < 0. Inserting the appropriate formula into
(10) and rearranging leads to (11). 
Proof of Proposition 3. To compute @`v
@z

`v=`v
, we shall apply the implicit function
theorem to equation (10), treating ' as a function of both `v and z. We obtain:
@`v
@z

`v=`v
=  
@'
@z

`v=`v
@'
@`v

`v=`v
=
n`+1v
zn`v +

`v
(+ )
< 0: (27)
Furthermore, applying the chain rule to the steady state relationship v = zn  
(`v)
we obtain:
@v
@z

v=v
= n+

(`v)+1
@`v
@z

`v=`v
= n
 
(zn`v   ) + (+)`v
zn`v +
(+)
`v
!
> 0: (28)
Proof of Proposition 4. Using the results presented in the proof of proposition (3),
it suces to show that
@'
@

`v=`v
= (`v   1) < 0
to imply that
@`v
@

`v=`v
> 0
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and
@v
@

v=v
=

`+1v
@`v
@

`v=`v
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 5. Recall that w = nA(1   `v)v. Using the steady-state
relationship v = zn  
(`v)
, in the vicinity of the steady state it holds that
w  !(`v)  nA(1  `v)

zn  
`v

:
To prove that, for a xed value of z, the function !(`v) is inverse U-shaped, note
that
@!
@`v
= nA(1  `v)

zn  
`v
 
  1
1  `v +

`+1v
zn  
`v
!
:
From simple algebra it follows that the term inside the last brackets, and hence the
whole derivative, is positive if and only if
'w(`v) = zn`
+1
v + (  1)`v    < 0;
and negative if the sign is reversed.
We note that 'w(0) =   < 0, and 'w(1) = zn    > 0. The last inequality
follows from the condition `v > `
piv
v , guaranteeing existence of an interior equilibrium.
Furthermore,
'00w(`v) = (+ 1)zn`
 1
v > 0; 8(`v 2 (0; 1]):
Hence, the continuous function 'w intersects zero exactly once in the interval (0; 1],
from below, at a point which we denote `maxv . It follows !(`v) is increasing for all
`v < `
max
v , and decreasing for all `v > `
max
v . Hence, ! is inverse U-shaped.
Let us now compare `maxv with `

v. Using (10), we have
`v < `
max
v , 'w(`v) < 0,


(1  `v)  `v < 0;
and hence, if `v >

+
, or equivalently if '


+

< 0, with ' dened as in (10).

Proof of Proposition 6. Recall that SWB = HA(1   `v)v+. Using the
steady-state relationship v = zn  
(`v)
, in the vicinity of the steady state it holds
that
SWB  
(`v)  HA(1  `v)

zn  
`v
+
:
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To prove that, for a xed value of z, the function 
(`v) is inverse U-shaped, note that
@

@`v
= HA(1  `v)

zn  
`v
+0@  
1  `v +
(+)
`+1v
zn  
`v
1A :
From simple algebra it follows that the term inside the last brackets, and hence
the whole derivative, is positive if and only if
's(`v) = zn`
+1
v +

+ 

  1

`v   + 

 < 0;
and negative if the sign is reversed.
We note that 's(0) =  +  < 0, and 's(1) = zn   > 0. The last inequality
follows from the condition `v > `
piv
v , guaranteeing existence of an interior equilibrium.
Furthermore,
'00s(`v) = (+ 1)zn`
 1
v > 0; 8(`v 2 (0; 1]):
Hence, the continuous function 's intersects zero exactly once in the interval (0; 1],
from below, at a point which we denote `maxv . It follows that 
(`v) is increasing for
all `v < `
max
v , and decreasing for all `v > `
max
v . Hence, 
 is inverse U-shaped.
Let us now compare `maxv with `

v. Using (10), we have
`v < `
max
v , 's(`v) < 0,  `v < 0;
which is trivially satised. Hence, it is always the case that `v < `
max
v . 
Proof of Proposition 7. From (10) it is derived that @'
@

`v=`v
= `v > 0 and hence,
because we also know that @'
@`v

`v=`v
> 0, it follows that @`v
@

`v=`v
< 0.
As  has no direct impact on v apart from the one through `v, from the chain
rule it follows that
@v
@

v=v
=
@v
@`v

v=v
@`v
@

`v=`v
=

`+1v
@`v
@

`v=`v
< 0: (29)
Proof of Proposition 8. For the non-employed, the steady state is computed as an
implicit solution to the following system of two equations:
'U(`v) = zn`
+1
v +



 +   

`v   

 = 0; (30)
v = zn  
`v
: (31)
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Because we know that v depends positively both on z and , and both these param-
eters are lower for the non-employed than for the employed (z is replaced with z,
and  is replaced with 0), it follows that vU is unambiguously lower than v
.20
Turning to the issue of `v;U , we note that it must satisfy the condition 'U(`

v;U) = 0
whereas `v satises '(`

v) = 0. Both these functions are increasing at their respective
zeros, and hence it suces to analyze the sign of '(`v)  'U(`v). We nd:
'(`v)  'U(`v) = zn`+1v (1  )| {z }
trust eect
 (1  `v)| {z }
spillover eect
: (32)
To nd the conditions under which `v > `

v;U , we ought then to nd the conditions
for which the above dierence is positive at `v (steady-state value for the employed),
i.e., the conditions for which 'U(`

v) < 0. Simple algebra completes the proof. 
A.2 Second order conditions
The current appendix justies that the Mangasarian second order condition holds
for our model (cf. Chiang, 1992) and thus it correctly describes a maximum of the
Hamiltonian 5, if only a certain parametric condition is met.
Dierentiating the maximand function F
F = HA(1  `v)v+e t (33)
twice with respect to `v and v, we obtain:
@2F
@`2v
= HAv+e t(   1)(1  `v) 2; (34)
@2F
@`v@v
=  (+ )HAv+ 1e t(1  `v) 1; (35)
@2F
@v2
= (+ )(+    1)HAv+ 2e t(1  `v): (36)
It is automatically veried that @
2F
@`2v
< 0 and @
2F
@v2
< 0. Some more algebra is necessary
to ensure that the determinant of the Hessian is positive, and thus the matrix is
negative denite, if
 + +  < 1: (37)
If the second order condition (37) holds, then F is concave with respect to both
variables jointly.
20The impact of  on vU is nil.
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Dierentiating the constraint function G given as
G = `vv(zn  v)  v (38)
twice with respect to `v and v, we obtain:
@2G
@`2v
= (  1)` 2v v(zn  v); (39)
@2G
@`v@v
= ` 1v (zn  2v); (40)
@2G
@v2
=  2`v : (41)
It is automatically veried that @
2G
@`2v
< 0 and @
2G
@v2
< 0. Some more algebra is necessary
to ensure that the determinant of the Hessian is positive, and thus the matrix is
negative denite, if

2
(zn)2 < (1 + )v(zn  v): (42)
If both (37) and (42) hold simultaneously, then by Mangasarian's theorem, the de-
scribed time path of (`v; v) describes a maximum of the Hamiltonian.
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